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THE MAGNA CARTA MEETS THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
AND THE INTERNET*
INTRODUCTION
The advancement of technology has tested and transformed the
laws of American society, 1  especially the law of personal
jurisdiction.2 The doctrine of personal jurisdiction governs the
ability of a court to legitimately exercise its authority over a
* See MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (Eng. 1215) (tracing the origins of procedural due process, and
its jurisdictional corollary, to Magna Carta when stating "[n]o free-man shall be seized ...
excepting ... by the laws of the land...."), reprinted in BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA
CARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 228, 239 (1900); see also Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101 (1877) ("The equivalent of the phrase 'due process of law,' according
to Lord Coke, is found in the words 'law of the land,' in the Great Charter."); Mark Kadish,
Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (indicating Magna Carta introduced concept of procedural due
process to English law); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1992)
(suggesting due process notions grew out of ch. 39); Peter Zablotsky, From a Whimper to a
Bang: The Trend Toward Finding Occurrence Based Statutes of Limitations Governing Negligent
Misdiagnosis of Diseases with Long Latency Periods Unconstitutional, 103 DICK. L. REV. 455, 479 n.2
(1999) ("The concept of procedural due process is derived from the Magna Carta.").
1 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (a)(1) (1999) (discussing advances in resources available to
individual citizens as result of rapid development of Internet as well as other interactive
computer services); see also Andrew E. Costa, Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace: A Taxonomy of
the Case Laz, 35 Hous. L. REV. 453, 454-55 (1998) (discussing issues that new technology poses
to society); Eric H. Findlay, Litigation on the Net: Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 62 TEX. B.J.
334, 336 (1999) (mentioning innovations in technology); Matthew Oetker, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Internet, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 613, 613 (1999) (stating technology induces changes in
society).
2 See Oetker, supra note 1, at 613 (stating that courts have been forced to modernize
personal jurisdiction law in response to technological advancements); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-80 (1985) (finding that modem communication and
transportation allowed for control of franchisee by nonresident parent company, satisfying
minimum contacts requirement); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
295-99 (1980) (discussing impact of automobile in interstate travel); Int'l Shoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1945) (noting that novel business practices allow corporate entities new
ways to distribute products through interstate commerce).
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defendant.3 The restrictions of the court are found in the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.4 At the inception of the personal
jurisdiction doctrine, states were limited to exercising personal
jurisdiction over individuals who were physically located within
their geographic borders.5 Innovations such as the railroad and the
automobile6 allowed a tortfeasor to transcend a forum's boundaries
with ease and speed, thus evading reproach and leaving a state's
citizen without redress. In 1945, the United States Supreme Court
remedied this problem by expanding the scope of the personal
jurisdiction doctrine in International Shoe v. Washington.7 The Court
held that a forum could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant so long as the defendant had initiated sufficient
"minimum contacts" with that forum.8 The key, therefore, is a
defendant's contacts with a jurisdiction, not the form or medium in
which those contacts may arise.9
3 See David Bender, Personal Jurisdiction and Web Sites, 547 P.L.I. PAT. 67, 69 (1999)
(defining personal jurisdiction); Costa, supra note 1, at 455 (stating that personal jurisdiction is
threshold issue in all litigation and governance); Oetker, supra note 1, at 615 (explaining
function of personal jurisdiction); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1144 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining personal jurisdiction as "the power of a court over the person of a defendant in
contrast to the jurisdiction of a court over a defendant's property or interest therein").
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ..... Id. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution states that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Foundation of personal jurisdiction is based in Due Process Clause. Oetker, supra note 1, at
615. Traditional limits of personal jurisdiction are based in due process notions. Robert W.
Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 24 No. 2
LIT.. 27, 28 (1998). Personal jurisdiction has been molded to comport with Due Process Clause.
Howard G. Zaharoff & Thomas W. Evans, Cyberspace and the Internet: Law's Newest Frontier, 41
B. B.J. 14, 24 (1997).
5 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 773 (1887) (holding that court cannot substitute quasi
in rem jurisdiction for in personam jurisdiction); Findlay, supra note 1, at 334 (discussing
holding of Pennoyer); Oetker, supra note 1, at 615 (explaining ramifications of Pennoyer);
Zaharoff & Evans, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing ramifications of Pennoyer).
6 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, (discussing use of automobile in interstate
movement); Costa, supra note 1, at 453 (discussing expansion of personal jurisdiction with
Internet).
7 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Costa, supra note 1, at 456 (stating that standards of personal
jurisdiction have been shaped by formulation of minimum contacts in Int'l Shoe); Hamilton &
Castanias, supra note 4, at 28 (stating origin of modem personal jurisdiction doctrine was Int'l
Shoe); Oetker, supra note 1, at 616 (stating expansion of doctrine began with Int'l Shoe).
8 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319-20 (creating "minimum contacts" test); see also Costa, supra
note 1, at 456 (discussing Court's "minimum contacts" formulation); Hamilton & Castanias,
supra note 4, at 28 (discussing "minimum contacts"); Oetker, supra note 1, at 616 (discussing
"minimum contacts").
9 See Costa supra note 1, at 504 ("A party's conduct is the best indicator of his intention to
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I. A NEW FORM OF TECHNOLOGY
A. The Problem
The recent emergence and exponential expansion of the Internet10
has created a number of legal problems,1 particularly in the arena
of personal jurisdiction.12 Cyberspace defies traditional, geographic
concepts of jurisdictional boundaries, since it "is a 'place' that is at
the same time nowhere and everywhere."1 3 Through the Internet,
the flow of information and commerce between the states and across
the globe has increased at an unparalleled rate.14 The courts have
reach out to a particular forum"); Findlay, supra note 1, at 334 (quoting Court's decision in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewic, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), which rejected notion that personaljurisdiction was defeated by lack of physical contact); Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 4, at
35 ("The relevant analysis should concern the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant ..."). See generally Gwen M. Kalow, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction
Over World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2274 (1997) (stating that
"courts must carefully apply the appropriate existing legal doctrines when deciding personal
jurisdiction issues based on Web activity").
10 See Bender, supra note 3, at 69 (stating that Internet is being used "on a scale
unimaginable" only few years ago); Curt A. Canfield & Joseph Labbe, Web or Windows?:
Planning for Internet/Intranet Technology - Explosive Growth Experienced, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1997,
at S2 (explaining that increased use of Internet is due, in part, to increased advertising and
ease of obtainin, access); Findlay, supra note 1, at 334 (stating Internet use "is growing at a
remarkable rate' ); see also Oetker, supra note 1, at 614 (illustrating dramatic increase in Internet
use over past few years).
11 See Costa, supra note 1, at 455 (listing issues arising in arenas of "free speech, privacy,
and intellectual property"). See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874, 885 (1997) (holding
unconstitutional provisions of Communications Decency Act which sought to protect minors
from harmful material on Internet); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36
F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1994) (addressing whether seizure of computer system containing
private, "unopened" e-mail was unlawful interception under Federal Wiretap Act); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994), modified on other grounds, 948
F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (applying principles of primary and contributory copyright
infringement to computer bulletin board system used to copy video games); Playboy
Enterprises Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (applying defenses and
standards of copyright law to computer bulletin board that posted copies of plaintiff's
photographs).
12 See Bender, supra note 3, at 69-70 (discussing possible potential liabilities in applying
personal jurisdiction doctrine); Findlay, supra note 1, at 336 (pointing out that millions of
Internet users operate in disregard and/or oblivion to concept of jurisdiction); Hamilton &
Castinias, supra note 4, at 27 (stating courts have been grappling with issue of applying
traditional doctrine to Internet cases); Oetker, supra note 1, at 614 (stating that current
technological advances require further revision of personal jurisdiction standards).
13 Costa, supra note 1, at 458; see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 851 (stating same); Blumenthal v.
Drodge, 992 F. Supp. 44,48 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing Internet's lack of territorial boundaries);
Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 4, at 29 (quoting Judge Nancy Getner as stating "[t]he
Internet has no territorial boundaries" in Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997)).
14 See Drodge, 992 F. Supp. at 48 (discussing how Internet has revolutionized ability to
send and receive information); Jonathon T. Cain, Internet Commerce Extends the Long Ann of the
Law, WASH. TECH., Feb. 20, 1977, at 20 (stating two hundred billion dollar figure will equate to
approximately 20% of total sales); Findlay, supra note 1, at 334 (stating "traffic on the Internet
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struggled to adapt personal jurisdiction law to this form of
technology and create a uniform doctrine so that Internet users may
conform their activities accordingly, and avoid being haled into an
unforeseeable forum.15 The results, however, have been less than
successful.16
Initially, this Note will give a brief history of both personal
jurisdiction and the Internet. Second, it will examine both cases that
have found personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants through
their Internet contacts,17and those cases that have declared Internet
contacts insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction.18 Finally, this
Note will explain why the stream of commerce theory is the most
is doubling every 100 days."); Oetker, supra note 1, at 614 (stating that by millennium, Internet
business is expected to gross two hundred billion dollars per year).
15 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (stating
uniformity is necessary to achieve predictability for out-of-state individuals and
corporations); Costa, supra note 1, at 459 (stating "application of due process standards to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is meant to ensure a degree of predictability for out-of-state
defendants"); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2242-43 (stating courts have been having difficulty
applying traditional doctrine and uniform test is necessary); Oetker, supra note 1, at 633
(concluding that uniform system needs to be created). But see Findlay, supra note 1, at 40
(concluding that Internet does not require formulation of new standards for exercise of
personal jurisdiction).
16 See Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 4, at 27 (illustrating confusion in recent federal
court decisions); Jose I. Rojas, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 547 P.L.I./PAT. 99, 104 (1999) (stating
that cases dealing with issue have been inconsistent). Compare Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that Missouri court could exercise personal
jurisdiction over California defendant in Missouri plaintiff's trademark action arising out of
defendant's Web site), with Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299-300
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that New York court did not have jurisdiction over Missouri
defendant in New York plaintiff's trademark action arising out of defendant's Web site).
17 See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996), rehearing en banc
denied, No. 95-3452, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24796 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts in conjunction with other contacts); Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952
F. Supp. 1119, 1125-26 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding jurisdiction based on Internet contacts in
conjunction with other contacts); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456
(D. Mass. 1997) (finding jurisdiction based on Internet contacts in conjunction with other
contacts); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conrn 1996) (finding
jurisdiction based on Internet contacts alone); Panavision Int'l, LP. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp.
616 (C.D. Cal 1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding jurisdiction based on Internet
contacts in conjunction with other contacts); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd.,
947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996) (finding jurisdiction based on Internet contacts in conjunction
with other contacts); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding
jurisdiction based on Internet contacts alone); Heroes, Inc. v. HeroesFound., 958 F. Supp. I (D.
D.C. 1996) (finding jurisdiction based on Internet contacts in conjunction with other contacts);
Humphrey v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), afd, 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (finding jurisdiction based on Internet contacts alone).
18 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding Internet
contacts not supporting jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir.
1997) (finding Internet contacts not supporting jurisdiction); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No.
96 CIV. 3620-PKL-AJP, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (finding Internet contacts
not supporting jurisdiction); Pres-kap, Inc. v. Sys. One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So.2d 1351 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding Internet contacts not supporting jurisdiction).
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appropriate theory to apply to cases based on Internet contacts. 19
II. THE INTERNET
A. Origin and History
The Internet is a culmination of computer networks. 20 It was
originally developed by the United States Department of Defense to
facilitate communication in the event of a nuclear attack,21 but has
mainly been utilized by the academic community. 22 Since the
Internet's inception, its use and activity have expanded
"exponentially." 23 The World Wide Web is only one segment of the
Internet, enabling the transmission of information through
photographs, audio, and text.24 Information placed on a Web site
19 See CoiipuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264-65 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985) when stating that defendant's contacts with plaintiff were far from "random,"
"fortuitous," or "attenuated," but rather were purposeful availment of laws of forum and its
commercial market); Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 30 (finding that mere foreseeability that defendant's
Web site could be viewed in forum was not enough to exercise personal jurisdiction);
Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420 (finding "effects test" inapplicable as defendant did not intentionally
aim its Internet conduct at forum while knowing it would cause harm there); Zippo, 952 F.
Supp. at 1126 (finding that by accepting and processing subscription applications from forum
and then assigning passwords to applicants, defendant was deliberately and systematically
availing itself of privileges and benefits of forum); EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 418 (finding
jurisdiction based upon terms of contract between parties and subsequent dealings, defendant
had "purposely availed itself of doing business in Arizona"); Digital Equipment, 960 F. Supp. at
464-66 (finding jurisdiction based on defendant conducting business and advertising over
Internet in forum); Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (findin jurisdiction lacking where
defendant's only contact with forum was via Internet and defendant had not contracted to
sell, nor sold products to residents in forum); Pres-Kap, 636 So.2d at 1353 (finding jurisdiction
lacking because defendant had no deliberate contact with forum; availment not purposeful).
20 See Bender, supra note 3, at 69 (examining technology of computer network systems);
see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), ajffd, 521 U.S. 844(1997)
(explaining Internet as connection of many individual networks); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue
Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D. Mass. 1997) (dassiying Internet as "a giant electronic
network which connects the smaller networks of the world').
21 See Bender, supra note 3, at 97 n.5 ("[T]he Internet was created to provide a multi-node
communications system for transmitting messages from any existing node to any other
existing node when some of the intermediate nodes were removed by nuclear attack."); see
also Oetker, siipra note 1, at 613 (examining Internet functions). See generally Findlay, supra note
1, at 336 (discussing innovations in technology).
22 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 36 (stating Internet is used to connect universities,
government agencies and other research entities); Bender, supra note 3, at 69 (stating Internet
used by universities); Costa, supra note 1, at 463 (stating government, universities and
corporations use networks); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2248 (discussing educational institutions'
use of Web to provide information about their schools).
23 Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 36 (discussing evolution of Internet); see also Bender, supra note 3
(stating use has "blossomed" over recent years); Costa, supra note 1, at 454 (noting growing
popularity of cyberspace); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2254 (discussing Web's popularity).
24 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 36 (discussing distinction between Web and Internet); Costa,
supra note 1, at 464 (explaining distinction between Web and Internet and uses of Web);
Kalow, supra note 9, at 2247-48 (detailing uses of Web); Oetker, supra note 1, at 622 (discussing
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can be "published" by anyone with access to the Internet.25 Due to
the relative ease of creating Web sites, a vast amount of
information 26 has become accessible to anyone with Internet access
across the globe.27 Users may access information on the Internet by
either going directly to a Web site's Internet address (if known) or
using a "search engine," which is designed to find sites through key
terms typed in by the user.28 Web site addresses are identifiable
through both a unique numeric address and an alphanumeric
address, called a "domain name."29
Domain names are registered and assigned by Network Solutions,
Inc., an entity under contract with the Internet Network Information
Center. 30 These names are organized into two basic levels.31 First,
the suffix, consisting of three letters, indicates the type of entity
which has posted the Web site, "e.g. '.edu' for educational
institutions, '.com' for commercial organizations, '.gov' for
government organizations." 32 In addition, a grouping of characters,
Web's role as method of retrieving information from Internet).
25 Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 36; see also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (describing procedure for
publishing on Web); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2245-46 (explaining process of publishing);
Thomas E. Weber, How Do 1 Create My Own Web Page?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at R25
(providing instruction on creation of Web page).
26 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 36 ("A vast array of information has accumulated on the
World Wide Web."); Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (indicating that Web contains newsgroups on
more than 15,000 different subjects); Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 4, at 29 (discussing fact
that companies selling information use Web to deliver this information); Kalow, supra note 9,
at 2247 (stating that there are numerous uses of Web to satisfy diverse user base).
27 See Findlay, supra note 1, at 335 (discussing use of Internet); Hamilton & Castanias,
supra note 4, at 29 (noting how development of graphical user interface opened up
communication over Internet); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2246 (discussing accessibility of
information on Internet); Weber, supra note 25, at R25 (illustrating that Web page can be
retrieved on Internet by people across globe).
28 See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (N.D. Inl. 1996) (noting that most
users rely on Web browsers to access Internet); Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 36 (discussing methods
of accessing sites); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2246 (discussing use of hyper-links).
29 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 36-37 (discussing domain names); see also Intermatic, 947 F.
Supp. at 1230-31 (discussing details of domain naming system); M.T.V. Networks v. Curry,
867 F. Supp. 202, 204 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing value of domain names); Costa, supra
note 1, at 464 (stating that users access Web site through its unique domain name).
30 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 37; see also Intenatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1231 (discussing
registration of domain names); Curry, 867 F. Supp. at 204 n.2 (stating that uniqueness of
Internet address ensured by registration services of Internet Network Information Center);
Zaharoff & Evans, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing registration and assignment of domain
names).
31 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 37 (stating "[diomain names are organized on two levels");
Kenneth S. Dueker, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet
Addresses, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 483, 492-93 (explaining domain name level structure);
Zaharoff & Evans, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing classification levels).
32 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 37; see also Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1231 (discussing
registration for ".com,". ".edu,' ".gov," and ".net" domain levels); Dueker, supra note 31, at
512 n.51 (discussing registry for top level domains); Zaharoff & Evans, supra note 4, at 14
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chosen by the entity, precedes the primary identifying suffix and
makes the domain name unique.33 Problems arise when competing
entities choose the same domain name,34 and most Internet litigation
has revolved around such conflicts. 35
B. Methods of Communication
The courts have discussed three methods of communication on
the Internet: real-time communications, person-to-person messages,
and information retrieval.36  These methods have different
characteristics leading to varying degrees of contact which could aid
in a personal jurisdiction inquiry.37
Real-time communications involve more than one person and
receipt is instantaneous. 38 Most Internet users engage in this form of
communication in "chat rooms," a computer forum provided by
commercial on-line providers in which participants type and send
(giving examples of different suffixes used).
33 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 37; see also Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 618
(C.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that businesses typically use
company name with suffix ".com" as Internet address); Dueker, supra note 33, at 492-93
(discussing Internet naming conventions); Ryan Yagura, Does Cyberspace Expand the Boundaries
of Personal Jurisdiction?, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 301, 303 (1988) (discussing domain names);
Zaharoff & Evans, supra note 4, at 14 (emphasizing that under current Internet naming scheme
only one organization can have particular name).
34 See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 37; Yagura, supra note 33, at 303 (discussing problems with
domain names); see also Dueker, supra note 33, at 493 (stating that unexpected melee has
ensued in trademark arena over Internet addresses); Zaharroff & Evans, supra note 4, at 14
(identifying problems arising when several companies conduct business under same "mark"
and seek to own such as their primary Internet address).
35 See Bender, supra note 3, at 70 (stating that trademark infringement actions are
frequent); Dueker, supra note 31, at 493 (stating that there are limited number of ways to make
domain names distinctive, which leads to inadvertent infringement); Hamilton & Castanias,
supra note 4, at 30 (stating most litigation has involved trademark infringement); Zaharoff &
Evans, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that "[slerious litigation has already occurred... by
trademark owners ... ").
36 See Oetker, supra note 1, at 621 (listing Internet communication methods); see also ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (describing real-
time communications, one-to-one or person-to-person messaging and remote information
retrieval). See generally Dale M. Cendali & Rebecca L. Weinstein, Personal Jurisdiction and the
Internet, 520 P.L.I./PAT. 975, 979 (1998) (comparing e-mail to phone calls).
3 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(employing "sliding-scale" method of analysis); Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834 (classifying methods
of communication for analysis); Cendali & Weinstein, supra note 36, at 980 (stating how
sending e-mail can be construed as purposeful availment of recipient forum); Oetker, supra
note 1, at 621, 623 (noting that different methods of Internet communication may lead to
different degrees of contact, ultimately affecting personal jurisdiction analysis, and discussing
various cases analyzing specific personal jurisdiction test employed by each court).
38 See Harley Hahn & Rick Stout; THE INTERNET COMPLETE REFERENCE 2, 394 (1994)
(discussing real-time communications); Ed Krol, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S GUIDE &
CATALOG 2, 256 (1996) (explaining real-time communications); Oetker, supra note 1, at 621
(discussing same).
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messages to each other.39 This form of communication has been
aptly compared to telephone communication by the courts.40
Person-to-person communication, commonly referred to as e-mail
(electronic mail), has been compared to mailing a letter through the
United States Postal Service,41 since one party may send another a
message without the receiver's knowledge or consent.42 A notable
difference between e-mail and conventional mail is that an e-mail
address does not notify the sender of the geographic location of the
receiver.43 This should be relevant to a court when determining
purposeful availment.
Information retrieval is the most debated topic in the field of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 44 This form of communication
involves one party posting a Web site on the Internet containing
information as text, audio, video, and pictures, allowing all who
have access to the World Wide Web to view the site.45 Hosts possess
two addresses for their sites: a numeric "IP" address and an
alphanumeric "domain name."46 The publisher is aware that their
39 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (discussing real-time communications or "chat rooms");
Costa, snpra note 1, at 464 (describing "Internet Relay Chat" and its real-time capabilities);
Krol, sitpra note 38, at 257-58 (discussing "chat rooms" as common form); Oetker, supra note 1,
at 621 (discussing "chat rooms").
40 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (comparing Internet Relay Chat to telephone party line);
Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111, 119 n.3 (D. Col. 1992) (noting
that court rulings serve to analogize Internet to telephone for purpose of determining contacts
in personal jurisdiction analysis); Costa, supra note 1, at 497 (emphasizing that courts have
compared telephones to Internet); Oetker, supra note 1, at 621 (comparing real-time
communications to telephones).
41 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834 (comparing e-mail to sending first class letter); Costa, supra
note 3, at 463-64 (discussing e-mail); Krol, supra note 38, at 92, 95 (making same comparison);
Oetker, suipra note 1, at 621 (discussing same analogy).
42 See Krol, suipra note 38, at 92, 95 (stating e-mail can be sent without recipient's consent);
Oetker, supra note 1, at 621 (describing act as unilateral).
43 See Krol, supra note 38, at 92-93 (explaining impossibility of determining physical
location of recipient in some circumstances); Oetker, supra note 1, at 621 (discussing difference
between conventional mail and e-mail).
44 See generally Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835-36 (describing three methods of file retrieval as
"ftp," "gopher" and World Wide Web); Costa, supra note 1, at 464 (describing information
retrieval); Oetker, supra note 1, at 622 (describing information retrieval as "probably the most
well-known method of Internet communication...').
45 See Oetker, supra note 1, at 622 (discussing forms of information available); see also Reno,
929 F. Supp. at 836 (explaining Web as "containing information from a diversity of sources");
Costa, supra note 1, at 464 (describing characteristics of information retrieval); Coe William
Ramsey, Burning the Global Village to Roast a Pig: The Communication's Decency Act of 1996 Is Not
"Narrozoly Tailored" in Reno v. ACLU, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1283, 1288 (1997) (discussing
forms of information available on Web sites).
46 See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 36-37 (D. Mass. 1997)
(discussing Internet address organization); see also MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202,
203 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining Internet address system); Michael Hatcher, Jay McDonnel
& Stacey Ostfeld, Computer Crimes, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 397, 399 n.4 (1999) (discussing two
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Web site is viewable from anywhere in the world. 47 While the
receiver unilaterally accesses the material, "the sending computer is
actively sending transmissions into the state of the receiver," which
may form the basis of personal jurisdiction over the sender since the
publisher is knowingly sending electronic messages into foreign
jurisdictions. 48
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
A. From Pennoyer to International Shoe
The Due Process requirements of the 5th and 14th Amendments of
the United States Constitution 49 place restrictions on courts'
jurisdictional reach.50 The Court established in Pennoyer v. Neff that,
absent consent, a court could only exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant who was physically present in its jurisdiction.51
addresses); Oetker, supra note 1, at 622 (explaining "information must be reached via Internet
address").
47 See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating
defendant's Web site was "continually accessible to every Internet-connected computer" and
therefore defendant had purposefully availed itself in forum); M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds
and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 347 (1996)
(discussing accessibility).
48 Oetker, supra note 1, at 623; see also Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161, 164 (D. Conn. 1996) (determining Internet advertisement's "repetitive" nature justified
exercising personal jurisdiction); Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715,
719, 721 (1997), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (finding Web site is active medium that
enables service provider's availment of benefits and privileges of forum).
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... " Id. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution states that "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Foundation of personal jurisdiction is based in Due Process Clause. See Oetker, supra note 1, at
615. Traditional limits of personal jurisdiction are based in due process notions. See Robert W.
Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias,Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and the Intenet, 24 NO. 2
LIT. 27, 28 (1998). Personal jurisdiction has been molded to comport with Due Process Clause.
See Howard G. Zaharoff & Thomas W. Evans, Cyberspace and the Internet: Law's Newest Frontier,
41 B. B.J. 14, 24 (1997).
50 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (stating that
"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of the state court to
render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant."); Costa, supra note 1, at
460 (discussing Due Process clause of 140h Amendment); Oetker, supra note 1, at 615
(discussing protections of 5th and 14Lh Amendments); David L. Stott, Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: The Constitutional Boundanj of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819, 826 (1997) (discussing constitutional limits placed on
personal jurisdiction).
51 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 773 (1877) (explaining extent of states' jurisdictional
reach); see also Kevin M. Clemont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L.
20001
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Technological advances, such as the railroad and automobiles,
allowed individuals to transcend geographic jurisdictional
boundaries with ease and speed.52 The United States Supreme Court
expanded the scope of personal jurisdiction to ensure the states'
interests in providing a forum where its citizens could receive
compensation for the harm caused by a foreigner.5 3 The Court held
that "due process requires [that a defendant] have certain minimum
contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 54
B. Specific and General Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court formed two types of jurisdiction: general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.55 General jurisdiction has been
defined as "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum that
are unrelated to the transaction giving rise to the lawsuit.56 Few
cases involving Internet litigation have asserted general
jurisdiction. 57
If the lawsuit is related to the defendant's contacts with the forum,
REV. 89, 97 (2000) (discussing Pennoyer's interpretation of due process requirements); Richard
Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARv. L. REV. 778, 802 n.81
(2000) (stating Pennoyer articulated territorial view of jurisdiction); Thomas R. Lee, In Rein
Jurisdiction In Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 97 (2000) (discussing importance of Pennoyer in
evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine); Aristotle G. Mirzaian, Y2K Vho Cares? We Have
Bigger Problems: Choice of Law In Electronic Contacts, 6 RicH. J.L. & TECH. 18, 66 (2000)
(discussing Pennoyer).
52 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-99 (discussing effect of automobile use and
interstate travel on personal jurisdiction); Costa, supra note 1, at 458 (discussing effect of
technological progress on personal jurisdiction); Oetker, supra note 1, at 616 (discussing
"advent of new technology").
53 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (expanding personal jurisdiction
doctrine); see also Oetker, supra note 1, at 616 (describing Int'l Shoe as expanding personal
jurisdiction doctrine); Rojas, supra note 16, at 102 (1999) (mentioning Int'l Shoe and its
progeny).
54 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also
Costa, supra note 1, at 460 (stating same); Oetker, supra note 1, at 616 (stating same).
55 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984)
(formulating distinction); Oetker, supra note 1, at 616 (mentioning Supreme Court's resolution
of problem); Rojas, supra note 16, at 103 (discussing difference between general & specific
jurisdiction).
56 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (defining general jurisdiction); Costa, supra note 1, at 462
(discussing parameters of general jurisdiction); Oetker, supra note 1, at 617 (discussing general
jurisdiction).
57 See Rojas, supra note 16, at 103 (stating same); see also Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp.
327, 333-34 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding court did not have general jurisdiction over Italian hotel in
action for injuries suffered in Italy based on hotel's Web site); Castanias, supra note 4, at 29
(stating no court, as of that writing, has exercised general jurisdiction based solely on Internet
contacts).
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then courts utilize a two-prong58 specific jurisdiction analysis.59
Both prongs must be satisfied for a state to assert personal
jurisdiction. 60 Under the first prong, the courts must examine the
quality and quantity of the defendant's contacts with the forum.61
That is, courts must first evaluate "how numerous and deliberate
the defendant's contacts with the forum state were."62 Whether one
could foresee being haled into court in the forum is insufficient to
assert jurisdiction.63 The defendant must "purposely avail itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State."64 The
judge must then analyze the relationship between the contacts and
the suit.65
The second prong of the test requires the courts to determine the
58 See Kalow, supra note 9, at 2251 (stating that specific jurisdiction entails two-part test);
Mirzaian, supra note 51, at 75 (discussing two prong test); Oetker, supra note 1, at 617
(describing specific jurisdiction analysis as two-prong test).
59 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) as
stating specific jurisdiction "arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum"); Beth I.
Bowland, The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction Under the Constitution: In What State, Exactly, is
the Internet Located?, 44 B. B.J. 16, 16 (2000) (discussing specific jurisdiction); Costa, supra note
1, at 463 (discussing specific jurisdiction); E. Gabriel Perle, John Taylor Williams & Mark A.
Fischer, Electronic Publishing and Software, Part II, 17 COMP. LAWYER 15, 16 (2000) (discussing
specific jurisdiction).
60 See Kalow, supra note 9, at 2241 (stating both prongs must be satisfied to assert personal
jurisdiction); Oetker, supra note 1, at 617 (stating same).
61 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-78 (1985) (explaining first prong
of analysis); Oetker, supra note 1, at 617 (stating same); Veronica M. Sanchez, Taking a Byte Out
of Mininun Contacts: A Reasonable Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark
Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1671, 1710 (1999) (discussing quality and quantity analysis); Linda
Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It's Not General Jurisdiction, or Specific
Jurisdiction, But is it Constitutional?, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559, 566 (1988) (discussing first
prong of analysis).
62 Oetker, supra note 1, at 617; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76 nn. 17-18
(articulating requirement); Sanchez, supra note 61, at 1710 (discussing quality and quantity
analysis); Simard, supra note 61, at 566 (discussing first prong of analysis).
63 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (stating
forseeability alone has never been sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction); see also Bender,
supra note 3, at 80 (stating same); Kenneth W. Brakebill, The Application of Securities Laws in
Cyberspace: Jurisdictional and Regulatonj Problems Posed by Internet Securities Transactions, 18
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 901, 925 (1996) (stating same); Eric W. Neilson, Starbright Distrib.,
Inc. v. Excelda Mfg. Co.: Getting the UCC in Step With Int'l Shoe for Structuring Jurisdictional
Conduct, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 235, 270 (1998) (stating same).
64 Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958); see also
Costa, supra note 1, at 461 (stating same); Scott M. Hagel, Civil Procedure-The Stream of
Commerce Theonj in Minnesota: Does the Shoe Fit?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 231, 236 (1998)
(discussing same); Michael MacClary, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL
& APP. ADVOC. 93, 109 n.39 (1998) (stating same).
65 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Darren L.
McCarthy, Internet Contacts and Fonan Notice: A Forum for Personal Jurisdiction, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 557, 589 (1998) (stating court must analyze contacts with forum); Oetker, supra note 1,
at 617 (discussing contacts analysis); Sanchez, supra note 61, at 1700 (stating court must
analyze cyberspace contacts).
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reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.66
The court must ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum
would offend "traditional conception[s] of fair play and substantial
justice." 67 The defendant's contacts must rise to the level "that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 68 The
Supreme Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen,69 identified five "gestalt"
factors that must be considered when determining fairness.70 They
are: (1) the defendant's burden of appearing; (2) the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy;
and (5) the common interest of all sovereigns in promoting
substantive social policies.71 Shortly thereafter, the Court stated that
when it was found that the defendant made deliberate contacts with
the forum, the burden shifted to the defendant to "present a
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations
66 See Marcus Johnson, Fair Play and Substantial Justice? Territory of Coverage Clauses and the
Assertion of Personal Jurisdiction Over Insurers, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 699, 708 (1999) (discussing
fairness prong); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2252 (discussing reasonableness prong); Oetker, supra
note 1, at 617 (classifying prong as "fairness" evaluation); Michael L. Russell, Back to the Basics:
Resisting Novel and Extreme Approaches to the Law of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 30 U.
MEM. L. REV. 157, 177 (1999) (discussing reasonableness prong).
67 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); see also Christopher D. Cameron
& Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forun Shopping and Outcome Determination Under Int'l
Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 769 (1995) (explaining that minimum contacts test remains
cornerstone of modem personal jurisdiction doctrine); Joelle Lee A. Nicol, Given an
Opportunith to Redefine the Gray Area of "Minimum Contacts," the Court in Prince v. Urban Chose
to Remain in the Dark, 25 W. ST. U.L. REV. 313, 313 (1998) (explaining how courts use disparate
approaches to determine existence or absence of personal jurisdictionlisting minimum
contacts as one of basic approaches); Rex R. Perschbacher, Foreward: Fift/ Years of Int'l Shoe:
The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513, 515-18 (1995) (explaining
minimum contacts test).
68 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see also Nicol, supra note 67, at 313 (discussing
key factors court uses in analyzing jurisdiction issues with Internet cases); Oetker, supra note
1, at 617 (quoting same); Pershbacher, supra note 67, at 515 (describing key factors that
influence whether court will exercise personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts).
69 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see also Findlay, supra note 1, at 336 (discussing minimum contacts);
Oteker, supra note 1, at 617 (discussing contacts). See generally Cameron & Johnson, supra note
67, at 769 (discussing minimum contacts application to Internet cases).
70 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (describing "gestalt factors" that must be
analyzed when considering fairness); see also United Elec., Radio and Machine Workers of
Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985), listing "gestalt factors"); Oetker, supra note 1, at 617
(discussing fairness evaluation). See generally Kalow, supra note 9, at 2252 (discussing fairness
evaluation).
71 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 282 (listing factors); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Alta
Vista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 470 (D. Mass. 1997) (discussing gestalt factors"); see also
Oetker, supra note 1, at 617 (discussing fairness evaluation). See generally Kalow, supra note 9,
at 2252 (discussing fairness evaluation).
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would render jurisdiction unreasonable." 72
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION CASES EXAMINING INTERNET CONTACTS
There has been no consensus among the courts of the United
States on the requirements necessary for a forum to establish
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on Internet
contacts. The cases may, however, be categorized into three units
for analytical purposes: (1) cases finding jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts; (2) cases finding jurisdiction based on Internet
contacts plus something more; and (3) cases finding Internet
contacts insufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction.
A. Internet Contacts Supporting Personal Jurisdiction
In Inset Systems v. Instruction Set, Inc.,73 the plaintiff ("Inset") sued
the defendant ("Instruction") for trademark infringement, claiming
that Instruction had unlawfully used its domain name (inset.com)
and toll-free number (1-800-US-INSET).74 Instruction had neither an
office in the forum, nor regular business activity in the state.75 The
court found that Instruction advertising via the Internet supported
the contention that it was directing its business to "all" states.76 The
court also discovered that Instruction's Web site could "reach as
many as 10,000 Internet users in Connecticut alone." 77 Such
potential led the court to believe that Instruction could "reasonably
anticipate the possibility of being haled into court [in the forum]." 78
72 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 282 (discussing
burden shift); Digital Equip., 960 F. Supp. at 470 (discussing burden shift); Oetker, supra note 1,
at 619 (discussing burden shift).
73 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
74 See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 162-63.
75 See id. at 164. See enerally Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995: You ve Come A Long Way Babyj- Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 133,133
(1991) (discussing trademark infringement); Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring"
Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 255 (1999) (discussing
trademark infringement); Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards A Reconciliation Witi
the Lanhain Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 105 (1995) (discussing
trademark infringement).
76 See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165. See generally Duffey, supra note 75, at 133 (discussing
trademark infringement); Oswald, supra note 75, at 255 (discussing trademark infringement);
Staffin, supra note 75, at 105 (discussing trademark infringement).
77 Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165. See generally Duffey, supra note 75, at 133 (discussing
trademark infringement); Oswald, supra note 75, at 255 (discussing trademark infringement);
Staffin, supra note 75, at 105 (discussing trademark infringement).
78 Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165. See generally Duffey, supra note 75, at 133 (discussing
trademark infringement); Oswald, supra note 75, at 255 (discussing same); Staffin, supra note
2000]
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The court was more concerned with the medium involved rather
than the quality or quantity of contacts. 79
In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,80 Maritz brought suit against
Cybergold seeking injunctive relief for Cybergold's trademark
infringement upon Martiz's domain name.81 The court stated that
the defendant intentionally created a Web site that could transmit to
any receiver across the globe82 and was "continually accessible to
every Internet-connected computer in [the forum]." 83 The court
found that the number of transmissions to the state's residents (131
times) showed that the defendant intended to purposely avail itself
in the forum.84 Even assuming arguendo that the tortuous conduct
had been committed in the defendant's home state, the assertion of
personal jurisdiction, said the court, would be proper because "the
allegedly infringing activities have produced an effect in [the forum]
as they have allegedly caused Maritz economic injury."8 5 The court,
in emphasizing the medium of contact,86 seems to indicate that the
mere creation of a Web site opens one to litigation anywhere, since it
is foreseeable that anyone can access it and possibly be injured.
75, at 105 (discussing same).
79 See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 164. See generally Duffey, supra note 75, at 133 (discussing
trademark infringement); Oswald, supra note 75, at 255 (discussing same); Staffin, supra note
75, at 105 (discussing same).
80 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). See generally Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 162-63(discussing trademark law); Costa, supra note 1, at 453 (discussing trademark law as it applies
to Internet); Sean M. Flower, When Does Internet Activity Establish the Miniunn Contacts
Necessarj to Confer Personal Jurisdiction?, 62 Mo. L. REv. 845, 845 (1998) (discussing personal
jurisdiction in Internet cases).
81 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1329 (discussing nature of claim). See generally Inset Sys., 937
F. Supp. at 162-63 (discussing trademark law as it applies to Internet); Costa, supra note 1, at
453 (discussing trademark law as it applies to Internet); Flower, supra note 80, at 845
(discussing personal jurisdiction in Internet cases).
82 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330. See generally Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 162-63
(discussing trademark law); Costa, supra note 1, at 453 (discussing trademark law as it applies
to Internet); Flower, supra note 80, at 845 (discussing personal jurisdiction in Internet cases).
83 Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330. See generally Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 162-63 (discussing
trademark law); Costa, supra note 1, at 453 (discussing trademark law as it applies to Internet);
Flower, supra note 80, at 845 (discussing personal jurisdiction in Internet cases).
84 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (discussing contacts). See generally Inset Sys., 937 F.
Supp. at 162-63 (discussing trademark law); Costa, supra note 1, at 453 (discussing trademark
law as it applies to Internet); Flower, supra note 80, at 845 (discussing personal jurisdiction in
Internet cases)
85 Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331. See generally Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 162-63 (discussing
trademark law); Costa, supra note 1, at 453 (discussing trademark law as it applies to Internet);
Flower, supra note 80, at 845 (discussing personal jurisdiction in Internet cases).
86 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330 (emphasizing Web site was primarily used for
advertising and that any of approximately 12,000 Internet users in forum could access it). See
generally Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 162-63 (discussing trademark law); Costa, supra note 1, at
453 (discussing trademark law as it applies to Internet); Flower, supra note 80, at 845
(discussing personal jurisdiction in Internet cases).
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Such decisions could potentially have devastating effects.87
B. Internet Contacts Plus Other Contacts Supporting Personal Jurisdiction
Some courts have found the exercise of jurisdiction proper over a
defendant who has maintained Internet contacts with the forum if
there were other independent contacts as well. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes
Foundation88 was a trademark infringement case 89 where the
defendant's only contacts with the forum were a newspaper
advertisement published in The Washington Post and the posting of a
Web site on the Internet.90 In light of the combination of contacts,
the court did not have to decide whether Internet contacts alone
could suffice for personal jurisdiction purposes.91 The court
emphasized, however, the fact that "unlike hard-copy
advertisements, Internet advertisements are in electronic printed
form so that they can be accessed again and again by many more
potential customers." 92 The court stated "that the defendant's home
page... constitute[d] a reasonable connection between the
defendant and the forum."93 The court determined that the
"pervasive and durable nature" of its electronic contacts was
illustrative of the defendant's purposeful availment of the forum's
benefits. 94 The court's focus primarily was upon the medium of the
87 See Findlay, supra note 1, at 340 (emphasizing that disregard of minimum contacts test
in Internet cases "presents a real threat to the growth of Internet commerce"); Oetker, supra
note 1, at 633 (discussing great benefits of Internet on global economy). See generally Costa,
supra note 1, at 453 (discussing courts' use of minimum contacts test); Christopher W. Merger,
World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction Around the Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH. L.
REV. 1269, 1269 (discussing courts' use of minimum contacts test).
88 958 F. Supp. 1 (D. D.C. 1996).
89 See id. at 1.
90 See id. at 1, 3 (discussing defendant's contacts with forum); see also Dagesse v. Plant
Hotel, No. 98-713-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *1073, 1074 (D.N.H. Jan. 5, 2000) (discussing
court's holding in Heroes); Barret v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp.2d 717, 717-18 (1999)
(discussing court's holding in Heroes); Aaron A. Vanderlaan, CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson:
Civil Procedure Enters the Cyber-Age, 41 ST. LouiS U. L.J. 1399, 1426-27 (1997) (discussing court's
holding in Heroes).
91 See Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5.
92 Id. at 5 (quoting Inset Sys., Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn.
1996)); see also EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ariz.
1996) (stating that unlike radio and television, Web sites are continuously accessible). See
generally Costa, supra note 1, at 483 (discussing new issues that technology poses to society).
93 Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5 (citing Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). See
generally Lori Elizabeth Jones, Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co. - The Pure Stream of Commerce
No Longer Flows Through the Fourth Circuit, 29 RICH. L. REV. 421, 421 (1995) (citing Heroes);
Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisal and a
Revised Approach, 77 Ky. L.J. 243, 244 (1989) (citing Heroes).
94 See Costa, supra note 1, at 483; see also Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5 (discussing persistent
nature of site); Bender, supra note 3, at 90 (stating court found purposeful availment satisfied
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contact.95
An analytical framework with respect to personal jurisdiction
over the Internet was created in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot
Corn, Inc.96 In this case, virtually all the defendant's contacts with the
forum were through the Internet. 97 The court began its analysis by
stating that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet."98
The court found that the defendant's contacts were sufficient to
exercise personal jurisdiction 99 using, what the court termed a
"sliding scale," which evaluated the substantive nature of the
defendant's Internet contacts.OO The sliding scale is a theoretical
continuum.101 At one end are "active" 102 Web sites, whereby the
defendant "enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
through site's durable nature); Vanderlaan, supra note 90, at 1426-27 (discussing holding in
Heroes). See generally Murphy, supra note 93, at 244 (discussing Heroes).
95 See Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5 ("Internet advertisements are in electronic printed forn so
that they can be accessed again and again by many more potential customers"); See Motty
Shulman, http://wno.personal-jurisdiction.coin, 23 NOVA L. REV. 781, 791 (1999) (stating Internet
allows for global advertising).
96 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
97 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126 (stating that defendant had advertised to forum, sold
approximately 3,000 passwords to forum subscribers and entered into seven contracts with
Internet access providers to service customers located in forum); see also Shulman, supra note
95, at 792-93 (analyzing Zippo approach to resolving personal jurisdiction issue); Tammy S.
Trout-Macintyre, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Does the Shoe Fit?, 21 HAMLINE L. REV.
223, 223-27 (1997) (discussing Zippo analysis). See generally Vanderlaan, supra note 90, at 1425
(discussing Zippo decision).
98 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
99 See id. at 1128 (concluding that assertion of jurisdiction was proper); see also Shulman,
snpra note 95, at 792-93 (analyzing Court's rationale in Zippo); Stephen Wilske & Teresa
Schiller, Int'l Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM.
L.J. 117, 165 (1997) (discussing Zippo decision). See generally Christopher E. Friel, Downloading a
Defendant: Is Categorizing Internet Contacts a Departure from the Minimum Contacts Test?, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 293, 318-19 (1998) (examining Court's holding in Zippo); Michael
L. Russell, Back to the Basics: Resisting Novel and Extreme Approaches to the Law of Personal
Irisdiction and the Internet, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 157, 168-69 (discussing Court's decision in
Zippo); Michael J. Sikora III, Beam Me Into Your Jurisdiction: Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Via
Electronic Contacts in Light of the Sixth Circuit's Decision in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 27 CAP.
U. L. REV. 163, 183-84 (1998) (analyzing Court's finding in Zippo).
100 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (stating "sliding scale" is in accord with modem
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence); see also Wilske & Schller, supra note 99, at 165 (discussing
"sliding scale" approach). See generally Friel, supra note 99, at 318-19 (examining Court's
holding in Zippo); Russell, supra note 99, at 168-69 (discussing Court's holding in Zippo).
101 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (describing scale as "spectrum"); Wilske & Schiller,
supra note 99, at 166 (discussing "sliding scale" approach). See generally Russell, supra note 99,
at 168-69 (discussing Court's decision in Zippo); Sikora III, supra note 99, at 183-84 (analyzing
Court's finding in Zippo).
102 Costa, supra note 1, at 481 (discussing active Web sites).
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jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of
computer files over the Intemet."103 In such circumstances, the
defendant has purposely availed itself of the forum and assertion of
personal jurisdiction is proper.104 At the other extreme are "passive"
sites, involving circumstances where the defendant has "simply
posted information on the Internet 'available to those who are
interested in it."'105 The court stated that personal jurisdiction
should not be exercised based on a passive Web site.106 In between
is the "middle ground," involving "interactive Web sites where a
user can exchange information with the host computer."107 The
assertion of jurisdiction is determined by analyzing "the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information... "108
The court emphasized that the medium should not affect personal
jurisdiction analysis.109 The defendant continuously and knowingly
assigned forum residents passwords to access its site's
information.110 The defendant was aware that its contracts with its
servers would lead to business in the forum.111 Furthermore, both of
these actions were absolutely within the defendant's control." 2
103 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also Shulman, supra note 95, at 793 (discussing Zippo
approach); Vanderlann, supra note 90, at 1425 (discussing Court's holding in Zippo); Wilske &
Schiller, supra note 99, at 165-66 (discussing Court's holding in Zippo). See generally Friel, supra
note 99, at 318-19 (examining Court's holding in Zippo); Russell, supra note 99, at 168-69
(discussing Court's holding in Zippo); Sikora III, supra note 99, at 183-84 (analyzing Court's
holding in Zippo).
104 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also Wilske & Schiller, supra note 99, at 165-66
(discussing Court's holding in Zippo). See generally Sikora I1, supra note 99, at 183-84
(analyzing Court's holding in Zippo).
105 Costa, supra note 1, at 481 (quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
106 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (describing passive Web sites); see also Sanchez, supra
note 61, at 1704 (discussing analysis in Zippo); Shulman, supra note 96, at 793 (discussing
passive Web sites); Vanderlaan, supra note 90, at 1425 (discussing Court's holding in Zippo).
107 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. See generally Friel, supra note 99, at 318-19 (examining
Court's holding in Zippo); Russell, supra note 99, at 168-69 (discussing Court's holding in
Zippo); Sikora III, supra note 99, at 183-84 (analyzing Court's holding in Zippo).
108 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. See generally Friel, supra note 99, at 318-19 (examining
Court's holding in Zippo); Russell, supra note 99, at 168-69 (discussing Court's holding in
Zippo); Sikora IIl, supra note 99, at 183-84 (analyzing Court's holding in Zippo).
109 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 ("[D]ifferent results should not be reached simply
because business is conducted over the Internet.").
110 See id. at 1126; see also Sanchez, supra note 61, at 1704 (discussing analysis in Zippo);
Vanderlaan, supra note 90, at 1425 (discussing Court's holding in Zippo).
111 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. See generally Friel, supra note 100, at 318-19 (examining
Court's holding in Zippo); Russell, supra note 100, at 168-69 (discussing Court's holding in
Zippo); Sikora III, supra note 100, at 183-84 (analyzing Court's holding in Zippo).
112 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. See generally Friel, supra note 100, at 318-19 (examining
Court's holding in Zippo); Russell, supra note 100, at 168-69 (discussing Court's holding in
Zippo); Sikora III, supra note 100, at 183-84 (analyzing Court's holding in Zippo).
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These factors allowed the court to conclude that jurisdiction was
proper.113
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,114 was a trademark
infringement case1 15 where the defendant was found to be a "cyber-
squatter"116 (one who registers a domain name of a company on the
Internet in anticipation of later licensing the rights of that name to
the company for use on the World Wide Web). The court noted that
the defendant was not conducting business in the forum, but he
intentionally acted in a manner that had harmful effects in the
forum.117 The court applied the "effects test" articulated in Calder v.
Jones,118 i.e., if the defendant's acts were intended to, and did, harm
the plaintiff in the forum, the purposeful availment prong has been
satisfied.
It seems the court could have asserted personal jurisdiction over
the defendant without using the "effects test." It is ambiguous
whether a defendant intended to avail itself of a forum, when their
only contacts have been through the Internet. In Panavision,
however, the defendant also sent a letter to the plaintiff requesting
113 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1128 (stating jurisdiction was proper); see also Sanchez, supra
note 107, at 1704 (discussing analysis in Zippo); Vanderlaan, supra note 107, at 1425 (discussing
Court's holding in Zippo).
114 141 F.3d 1316 (9Lh Cir. 1998).
115 See id. at 1318 (discussing issues presented).
116 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1318. On Toeppen's "panavision.com" Web site, he had aerial
photographs of Pana, Illinois; on his "panaflex.com" site, he simply posted word "Hello." Id.
at 1319. Toeppen, at time of his trial, had registered over 100 domain names of well-known
companies for useless Web sites on the Internet. Included were "americanstandard.com."
"aircanada.com," deltaairlines.com," "flydelta.com," "northwestairlines.com,"
"yankeestadium.com," and "frenchopen.com." See Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 4, at 32.
Internet is a broad medium for jurisdictional problems and is not itself an independent contact
to allow assertion of jurisdiction. See Costa, supra note 1, at 458. Trademark dilution
accomplished through intentional "pirating" of domain names has become a serious problem.
See generally Sally M. Abel, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier, 5 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 91 (1998/99).
117 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322 (stating that defendant's intentional action justified
assertion of jurisdiction); see also Abel, supra note 116, at 3 (asserting that intentional dilutions
may warrant jurisdiction over cyberspace); Costa, supra note 1, at 458 (discussing defendant's
intentional actions). See generally Michael E. Allen, Analyzing Minimum Contacts Through the
Internet: Should the World Wide Web Mean World Wide Jurisdiction?, 31 IND. L. REV. 385, 385
(1998) (analyzing whether certain forum contacts via Internet warrant assertion of personal
jurisdiction).
118 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (discussing "effects test"); see also Allen, supra note 117, at 7 (stating
that Panavision vividly illustrates how "effects test" can be used to transform extremely
tenuous contact with distant state through Internet related activity into contact sufficient to
satisfy minimum contacts test); Karin Mika & Aaron J. Reber, Internet Jurisdictional Issues:
Fundamental Fairness in a Virtual World, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1169, 1180 (1997) (explaining
factors considered by Calder Court). See generally Oetker, supra note 1, at 615 (explaining
evolution of modern personal jurisdictional doctrine).
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$13,000 in exchange for the rights to the domain name.119 Such a
letter could be construed as a purposeful attempt to solicit business
in the forum.120 The court, therefore, was correct in its result, yet it
seems the court's rationale could be justified on the specific facts of
the case without employing the effects test. Some commentators
suggest, however, that the effects test is an acceptable rationale for
courts to use in Internet cases. 121
EDIAS Softvare International, L.L.C. v. BASIS International Ltd.,122
was a case involving both contract and tort actions.123 Pursuant to
their agreement, EDIAS was to distribute BASIS' software products
in various European countries.124 EDIAS had offices in Arizona (the
forum), Germany and the Netherlands.125 BASIS was located in
119 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319 (discussing defendant's correspondence); see also Abel,
supra note 117, at 3 (announcing proposition that cyberspace is medium of personal
jurisdiction problems); Costa, supra note 1, at 458 (stating that notwithstanding any forum of
Internet presence as accessible by any user belies notion of per se purposeful availrnent of
particular forum); Vanderlaan, supra note 90, at 1399 (explaining that cyberspace has no
traditional boundaries).
120 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319 (construing defendant's act of sending letter to
plaintiff, in addition to Internet contacts, as evidence of minimum contacts and"purposeful
availment"); see also Allen, supra note 117, at 385 (analyzing whether single contact was
sufficient-to render defendant amenable to personal jurisdiction); Vanderlaan, supra note 90, at
1399 (discussing purposeful availment with its relationship to jurisdiction in realm of
cyberspace). See generally Oetker, supra note 1, at 621 (discussing problem of comparing e-mail
to conventional letters).
121 See Allen, supra note 117, at 385 (stating "effects test" doctrine may justify assertion of
jurisdiction over foreign defendant with Internet contacts); Costa, supra note 1, at 500-01
(supporting "effects test"); Oetker, supra note 1, at 615 (suggesting that "effects test" doctrine
is means of rationalizing assertion of jurisdiction over defendant with Internet contacts).
122 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996). See generally Michele N. Breen, Personal Jurisdiction and
the Internet: "Shoehorning" Cyberspace into Int'l Shoe, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 763 (1988)
(discussing issues raised by Internet in personal jurisdiction doctrine); Sam Puathasnon,
Cyberspace and Personal Jurisdiction: The Problem of Using Internet Contacts to Establish Minimum
Contacts, 31 LOG. L. A. L. REv. 691, 691 (1988) (stating that electronic communication threatens
modem concepts of personal jurisdiction doctrine; addressing issues of personal jurisdiction
confronted in Panavision); Scott D. Sanford, Nowhere to Run and Nowhere to Hide: Trademark
Holders Reign Supreine in Panavision v. Toeppen, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1999)
(explaining framework for exercising personal jurisdiction over Internet).
123 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 415 (discussing plaintiff's complaint); see also Abel, supra
note 116, at 3 (arguing how personal jurisdiction is hard to establish over free computer
space); Costa, supra note 1, at 458 (discussing difficulties of defendant's fighting assertions of
personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts); Puathasnon, supra note 122, at 691
(discussing defendants' difficulties in resisting claims of personal jurisdiction).
124 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 414 (discussing contract). See generally Breen, supra note 122,
at 763 (stating that Internet contacts are insufficient to assert jurisdiction over foreign
defendant); Puathasnon, supra note 122, at 691 (stating that Internet contacts are insufficient to
satisfy minimum contacts test); Sanford, supra note 122, at I (stating Internet contacts alone are
insufficient to establish jurisdiction over foreign defendant).
125 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 414 (discussing contacts). See generally Sanchez, supra note
61, at 1704 (stating minimum contacts test is vague); Shulman, supra note 95, at 791 (discussing
personal jurisdiction applied to Internet contacts).
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New Mexico. 126 The contract was signed in New Mexico and
contained a clause stating New Mexico law would govern.127 BASIS
became dissatisfied with EDIAS and terminated their agreement.128
BASIS subsequently sent e-mail messages to its employees and
posted a "Press release" on its Web site explaining its reasons,
which led to the suit.129
The court found the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant proper based upon the subsequent dealings between the
parties after the formation of the contract 130 and because the
defendant's e-mail and Web site messages were intended to cause
harm to the plaintiff in the forum.131 In applying the effects test, the
court stated "BASIS should not be permitted to take advantage of
modern technology through an Internet Web page and forum and
simultaneously escape. . . jurisdiction."132 The court concluded that
the defendant had "purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing
business" in the forum.133
126 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 414 (discussing contacts); see also Puathasnon, supra note
122, at 691 (discussing same); Sanford, supra note 122, at 1 (discussing same); Shulman, supra
note 95, at 791 (discussing same).
127 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 414 (discussing contacts); see also Mathew Phelps, Recent
Developments: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law VIII Jurisdiction and the Internet, 25
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1135, 1135 (1999) (discussing difficulty of analyzing Internet contacts
for jurisdiction purposes); Sanford, supra note 122, at 1 (discussing problem Internet poses to
personal jurisdiction doctrine); Shulman, supra note 95, at 781 (discussing difficulty of
applying personal jurisdiction doctrine to Internet contacts).
128 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 414 (discussing contacts); see also Wilske & Schiller, supra
note 99, at 165-66 (discussing EDIAS).
129 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 414 (discussing contacts); see also Wilske & Schiller, supra
note 99, at 165-66 (discussing EDIAS).
130 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 416 (discussing numerous telephone calls and e-mail
messages between parties); see also Wilske & Schiller, supra note 99, at 165-66 (discussing
EDIAS).
131 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 418 (classifying harms as intentional); see also Brainerd v.
Governors of the Univ. of Arizona, 837 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that statements
made by Canadian during phone call to Arizona conferred jurisdiction in Arizona since
defendant knew call would cause harm in forum).
132 EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 418 (emphasis added). See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
789-90 (1984) (holding California's exercise of jurisdiction over Florida defendant proper,
using effects test); Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining
Internet contact was insufficient to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendant). See generally
Allen, supra note 117, at 385 (stating that although "effects test" may be used to establish
jurisdiction for defendant's intentional contacts, such assertion of jurisdiction with respect to
cyberspace contacts is "unlikely"); Oetker, supra note 1, at 617-18 (stating "mere likelihood"
that activities will reach forum is insufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction).
133 EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 418. But see Allen, supra note 117, at 385 (stating that although
"effects test" may be used to establish jurisdiction for defendant's intentional contacts, such
assertion of jurisdiction with respect to cyberspace contacts is "unlikely"); Oetker, supra note
1, at 617-18 (stating "mere likelihood" that activities will reach forum is insufficient to exercise
personal jurisdiction).
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It seems that the subsequent dealings between the parties could
have satisfied the purposeful availment requirement without the
court resorting to an effects test analysis. Contacts included a
contract, telephone, e-mail and fax communications, as well as
BASIS' sale of approximately $858,000 worth of merchandise to
forum consumers. 134 These contacts suggest that the defendant
"could have anticipated being 'haled into court' in Arizona." 135
In Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,1 3 6 Digital
brought suit against AltaVista alleging the defendant violated a
licensing agreement it had with Digital to use the name
"AltaVista." 137 The court found the exercise of personal jurisdiction
proper over AltaVista, regardless of the defendant's attempts to
structure its relationship with the plaintiff in order to avoid being
subject to suit in the forum, stating:
[AltaVista] may well have done everything possible to avoid
jurisdiction in terms of its contract and non-Web contacts with
[the forum]. [AltaVista's] Web-site, its design, the extent to
which it infringed Digitals' trademark, and breached the
contract, however necessarily changes the equation: This Web-
site, in context, creates minimum contacts.138
The court noted that it did not have to decide whether Internet
activity alone could subject a foreigner to personal jurisdiction in the
forum.139 The court held the assertion of jurisdiction was proper
134 See EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 415, 417 (discussing contacts and dealings between parties);
see also Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding that continuous obligations to forum residents may satisfy purposeful availment);
Abel, supra note 116, at 3 (discussing contacts); Sanford, supra note 122, at 1 (discussing
Internet contacts with foreign forum); Schulman, supra note 95, at 791 (discussing contacts).
135 EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 418 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)); see also Allen, supra note 117, at 391 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen); Costa,
supra note 1, at 458 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen).
136 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997); see also Abel, supra note 116, at 3 (asserting that
intentional dilutions/contacts may. warrant jurisdiction in cyberspace); Allen, supra note 117,
at 385 (illustrating how Panavision's "effects" doctrine can be usedto assert jurisdiction based
on Internet contacts); Oetker, supra note 1, at 615 (showing that personal jurisdiction may be
established through "effects" doctrine).
137 See Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 459 (discussing nature of suit and licensing agreement).
138 Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 469; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 253 (1958)
(creating test for cases where cause of action does not arise from defendant's minimum
contacts with forum); cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 189-90 (1984) (noting necessary level of
minimum contacts is lower where harm is intentional).
139 See Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 463 (framing issue before court).
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because: (1) the defendant conducted business in the forum;140 (2) its
Web site caused injury in the forum;141 and (3) the injury in the
forum was the result of the defendant's foreign activities, i.e., its
creation of a Web site outside the forum.142
The court acknowledged the implications of its decision, that such
a rationale could subject those who create Web sites to jurisdiction
in any part of the globe.143 The court stated, however, that its
holding would not likely lead to inconsistent results in future cases,
or restrict commerce conducted over the Internet.144
C. Internet Contacts Not Supporting Personal Jurisdiction
Although some courts have found the exercise of jurisdiction to be
proper based on a foreign defendant's Internet contacts with the
forum, there a number of courts which have held that Internet
contacts are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. For
example, in Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,145 Pres-
Kap was a New York-based travel agency that contracted with the
Florida-based plaintiff to use the plaintiffs computerized
140 See id. at 464-66 (stating defendant's contract in conjunction with its activities and sales
satisfied forum's long-arm statute). See generally Foster-Miller v. Babcock and Wilcox Canada,
46 F.3d 138, 145-46 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 210 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (outlining approaches to
motions to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction); Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d
671,677 (1st Cir. 1992) (outlining method whereby judge conducts limited fact-finding rather
than definitive fact-finding to determine likely existence of facts necessary to support personal
jurisdiction).
141 See Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 466-67 (stating misrepresentations made on Web site were
made in forum for jurisdictional purposes).
142 See id. at 467 (explaining Web site's continuous accessibility in conjunction with other
contacts as "persistent course of conduct sufficient to satisfy" personal jurisdiction inquiry);
see also Ealing Corp. v. Harrods LTD, 790 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that
misrepresentations sent into forum via telex provided basis for personal jurisdiction); Burtner
v. Burnham, 430 N.E.2d 1233,1237 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (holding personal jurisdiction proper
over defendant who knowingly sends false information into forum intending it to be relied on
and causing injury in forum).
143 See Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 463 (discussing possible ramifications of decision); see also
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (discussing
possible hindering of free speech caused by state regulations of Internet communication).
144 See Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 463 (presuming effects of decision); see also Abel, supra note
116, at 3 (stating that intefitional contacts may warrant jurisdiction over computer media but
such proposition is not per se rule). But see Costa, supra note 1, at 498 (stating that "the case
law suggests anything but consistency and predictability").
145 636 So.2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 645 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1994); see also
Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that such Internet contacts
are not sufficient for personal jurisdiction); Allen, supra note 117, at 385 (stating Internet
contacts alone are insufficient to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendant); Sanford, supra
note 122, at 1 (stating Internet contacts alone are insufficient to assert jurisdiction over foreign
defendant).
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reservation program.146 The contract was formed and signed in New
York.147 Pres-Kap subsequently claimed that the system
malfunctioned and Pres-Kap stopped making payments;
subsequently System One brought suit for breach of contract.148
The court stated that "an individual's contract with an out-of-state
party alone can [not] automatically establish" grounds for asserting
personal jurisdiction over the foreigner.149 Further, there was no
evidence that the defendant was aware of the location of the
plaintiff's database.150 Therefore, the court found that the defendant
had no deliberate contact with the forum and the availment was not
purposeful.151
The case is novel in that the defendant was a consumer, as
opposed to being a provider.152 The court was concerned with
protecting consumers, as a class, from being subject to personal
jurisdiction in foreign forums for merely engaging with on-line
providers.153 To assert jurisdiction in such cases would be "wildly
beyond the reasonable expectations of such computer-information
users."
154
In another case, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,155 the plaintiff
146 See Pres-Kap, 636 So.2d at 1351-52 (discussing background facts). See generally Costa,
supra note 1, at 458 (analyzing Internet contacts through traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrine); Michael MacClary, Personal ]urisdiction and the Internet, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL 8 APP.
ADV. 93, 93 (discussing how Supreme Court has applied jurisdiction to non-forum residents
and analyzes how such analysis should be used when confronting Internet cases); Trout-
Macintyre, snpra note 97, at 223 (analyzing Internet contacts through traditional personal
jurisdiction doctrine).
147 See Pres-Kap, 636 So.2d at 1353.
148 See id. at 1352.
149 See id. at 1353 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985))
(alteration in original); see also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320 (discussing purposeful availment);
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 503 (Ha. 1989) (finding that failure to make
installment payments to plaintiff in forum is insufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendant); Castanias, supra note 4, at 35 (discussing application of Burger King to
Internet jurisdiction questions).
150 See Pres-Kap, 636 So.2d at 1353.
151 See id. (stating database "happen[ed] to be located in [forum]").
152 See id. at 1351-52 (classifying parties); Allen, supra note 117, at 385 (classifying parties);
Costa, supra note 1, at 470 (mentioning cases exceptional character); see also Sanford, supra note
122, at 1 (classifying parties).
153 See Pres-Kap, 636 So.2d at 1353 (stating that finding jurisdiction in this case
"would...have far reaching implications" for all foreign consumers); see also Panavision, 141
F.3d at 1318 (stating that although "effects" doctrine may warrant jurisdiction, such
implications are far reaching); Oetker, supra note 1, at 615 (discussing minimum contacts
doctrine's implications with respect to Internet contacts). But see Costa, supra note 1, at 458
(noting that per se rule of jurisdiction is difficult to infer with respect to cyberspace).
154 Pres-Kap, 636 So.2d at 1353.
155 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Breen, supra
note 122, at 763 (applying minimum contacts test to Internet contacts); Puathasnon, supra note
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owned the rights to the registered mark "The Blue Note" and
operated "The Blue Note" jazz club in New York.156 Defendant King
was the owner and operator of "The Blue Note" club in Missouri.1 57
The defendant posted a Web site that advertised his club and
contained a telephone number and ticket-purchasing information.158
The court found that the defendant had not purposely availed
itself of the privilege of doing business in New York'59 because in
order for customers to purchase tickets, they would have to go to
Missouri, since the defendant would not mail them. 60 Furthermore,
the plaintiff's argument, that the defendant should have foreseen his
Web site being accessed in the forum and causing injury there, was
without merit.161 The court held that the "mere foreseeability of in-
state consequence" was insufficient to sustain personal
jurisdiction.162 The court analogized the creating of a Web site with
the placing of a product in the "stream of commerce," in that its
effects "may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without
more, it is not an act directed toward the forum state." 163 Therefore,
New York did not have jurisdiction based merely on the fact that a
Missouri resident had posted a Web site that could be accessed by
New York residents.164
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.165 was a trademark infringement
122, at 691 (discussing application of minimum contacts test to Internet contacts); Sanford,
supra note 122, at 1 (discussing application of minimum contacts test to Internet contacts).
156 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 295.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 295
159 See id. at 299-301 (stating that (1) New York's long-arm statute did not grant
jurisdiction, and (2) assertion of jurisdiction would violate Due Process Clause because there
was no purposeful availment on behalf of defendant to conduct business in forum).
160 See id. at 299 (discussing several steps purchaser must take to get tickets); see also Shea
v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd without opinion, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997)
(discussing procedure for accessing and retrieving information from Web site).
161 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300 (discussing plaintiff's argument); see also Darienzo v.
Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (App. Div. 2d Dep't. 1980) (noting that New York
law requires more than mere foreseeability, defendant must make "a discernable effort... to
serve, directly or indirectly, a market in the forum").
162 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (stating that foreseeability that product could make its way into forum
is not sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction).
163 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
164 But cf. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (ED. Mo. 1996) (holding
Missouri had personal jurisdiction over California defendant because defendant's Web site
caused injury to forum plaintiff and could be accessed in forum).
165 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
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case involving the defendant's Web site.166 The defendant had no
contacts with the forum.167 Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that
the defendant should be required to answer in the forum because
the Internet has no boundaries, and a Web site is "necessarily
intended for use on a world wide basis." 168 The court countered by
noting that universal accessibility does not necessarily bespeak
intent to focus on any particular forum.169 The court also found the
effects test inapplicable170 because there were no grounds for
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant,171 and that the Web site
was passive in nature.172
In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,173 the defendant created a Web site,
intending to recruit lawyers who wished to become members of a
network which would provide legal support services.1 74 The
defendant used a domain name similar to the plaintiff's, who
subsequently brought suit for trademark infringement. 75 No
services were available at the time the plaintiff brought suit.176
The court analogized the defendant's Web site with a magazine
advertisement and stated that "national publications [were] not
sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction under [New York
law]." 177 The court found Bensusan to be persuasive authority in this
case,1 78 and held that the establishment and maintenance of a Web
site was passive and insufficient to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.179
166 See id. at 415.
167 See id. at 419 (stating that defendant merely "post[ed] an essentially passive home
page on the web" and did not "invoke the benefits and protections of [the forum's] law").
168 Id. at 415 (discussing plaintiff's view).
169 See id. at 419 (noting plaintiff only person in forum to access defendant's Web site).
170 See id. at 420 ("[w]e don't see this as a Calder case").
171 See id.
172 See id. at 418 (discussing that cases which have held jurisdiction proper have found
"something more" to illustrate defendants' contacts were intentional).
173 See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. CIV.3620-PKL-AJP, 1997 WL 97097, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
174 See id. at *1 (explaining nature of defendant's Web site).
175 See id. (discussing nature of claim).
176 See id.
177 Id. at *10.
178 See id. at *15 (discussing applicability of Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997)).
179 See id. at *21 (concluding assertion of personal jurisdiction improper).
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V. SUGGESTED RESOLUTION
A. Stream of Commerce
Since there is so much uncertainty among the courts that have
dealt with cases involving the exercise of personal jurisdiction based
on Internet contacts, 180 the courts should utilize a test that will bring
order to this problem. Courts should utilize the "stream of
commerce" theory enunciated in Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of
California.181 This approach analyzes the defendant's contacts with a
Web site, focusing on how interactive the site is.182 Through this
analysis, the mere act of creating a Web site accessible to all would
be insufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
hence, other contacts would be necessary to assert jurisdiction.183 To
subject a foreign defendant to jurisdiction based on its product
entering the forum, the court must find that (1) the defendant
intentionally directed its product toward the forum; and (2) the
exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable over the defendant.184
The "stream of commerce" analysis tends to promote the
180 See Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 4, at 27 (illustrating confusion in recent federal
court decisions); Jose I. Rojas, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 547 P.L.I./PAT. 99, 104 (1999) (stating
that cases dealing with issue have been inconsistent). Compare Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that Missouri court could exercise personaljurisdiction over California defendant in Missouri plaintiff's trademark action arising out of
defendant's Web site), zwith Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299-300
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding New York court did not havejurisdiction over Missouri defendant in New York plaintiff's trademark action arising out of
defendant's Web site).
181 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(plurality opinion); see also Bender, supra note 3, at 81 (stating stream of commerce theory is
recurring theme); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2269 (stating courts should follow Justice O'Connor's
stream of commerce approach); Oetker, supra note 1, at 631 (discussing same).
182 See Kalow, supra note 9, at 2270 (stating approach carefully analyzes contacts to or
from Web site to find purposeful availment); Oetker, supra note 1, at 631 (discussing focus of
approach); Stott, supra note 50, at 853 (discussing focus on interactivity of Web site).
183 See Kalow, supra note 9, at 2270 (articulating reasons supporting stream of commerce
approach); Timothy B. Nagy, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and Cyberspace: Establishing
Precedent in a Borderless Era, 6 COMM. L. CONsPECTuS 101, 111-12 (1998) (advocating for stream
of commerce approach because Internet "is constantly expanding, flexible application of the
traditional notions of personal jurisdiction is necessary to ensure that justice is served");
Oetker, supra note 1, at 631 (detailing requirements of approach).
184 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-16 (stating requirements for asserting jurisdiction based on
stream of commerce contacts); Kalow, supra note 9, at 2270 (discussing Justice O'Connor's
opinion). But see Bender, supra note 3, at 82 (discussing Justice Brennan's opinion in Asahi
stating that mere placement of product in stream of commerce satisfies purposeful availment
requirement without further evidence).
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principal tenets of personal jurisdiction doctrine. This approach
would be easy to apply since its structure has already been
promulgated in Asahi.185 This theory realizes that foreseeability is
insufficient to satisfy due process, and some degree of purposeful
availment is necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant.1 86 This model focuses on the contacts as opposed to the
medium utilized by the defendant, which will have the effect of
courts arriving at more uniform decisions.187 Using the "stream of
commerce" approach will allow Internet users to conform their
Internet activities in accordance with a firm doctrine. 188
CONCLUSION
An objective analysis of a defendant's contacts with a given
forum, under the traditional "quality/nature" framework, would
provide the most predictable results. The medium in which those
contacts have been expressed should have no bearing upon a
personal jurisdiction inquiry. Internet use is growing exponentially,
and has had a profound effect on the world's economy. Users need
a uniform doctrine so they may regulate their potential exposure to
liability with a degree of confidence. A framework focusing on a
user's purposeful availment of a forum achieves such a goal, while
allowing a degree of freedom so as not to restrict commerce. It is
urged that courts realize that a new form of contact does not
necessitate a new doctrine.
James M. Westerlind**
185 See Oetker, supra note 1, at 631 (stating one benefit of approach is that it has "already
been established in Asahi."); Stott, supra note 50, at 852-54 (emphasizing that stream of
commerce approach was utilized by Court in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996)); see also Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997), affd, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (using same test).
186 See Oetker, supra note 1, at 631 (discussing focus of stream of commerce approach);
Bender, supra note 3, at 82 (interpreting O'Connor's plurality opinion as stating that mere
foreseeability that defendant's product could find its way into forum is insufficient to satisfy
purposeful availment requirement).
187 See Kalow, supra note 9, at 2270 (discussing how stream of commerce approach
ensures predictable results); Otker, supra note 1, at 631 (noting that other approaches would
result in all Web sites being subject to jurisdiction throughout globe).
188 See Costa, supra note 1, at 459 (stating due process demands degree of predictability);
Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 4, at 28 (ilustrating need for people to be able to predict
outcomes of personal jurisdiction inquiries to adjust conduct accordingly); Kalow, supra note
9, at 2269 (stressing need for uniformity in personal jurisdiction decisions).
** Thank you to Professor Charles E. Biblowit at St. John's University School of Law, for
encouragement and research guidance; Mark Engel, Russel D. Francisco, Karen Kowalski and Paolo Torzilli
for their constructive insights; and the Volume 15 editors and staff members of St. John 's Journal of Legal
Commentary who, through their ardent efforts and helpful comments, facilitated publication of this Note.
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